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1. These are specified in the
Digital Agenda, one of seven
flagship initiatives of the
Europe 2020 strategy to
prepare the EU economy for
the next decade. See:
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/digital-agenda-
europe.
2. We define ‘fast
broadband’ as broadband
based on ‘fibre to the x’
(FTTx) technologies, which
are much faster than the
previous copper-based
technologies; see the
technical annex.
1 INTRODUCTION
Next generation access (NGA) networks,
a fibre-based high-speed broadband infrastruc-
ture, are a general purpose technology with the
potential to trigger productivity gains on a massive
scale. These gains might take years to accrue,
because new applications and new organisational
and production designs that use NGA networks
need time to be developed. Nevertheless, we
consider wide NGA infrastructure roll-out to be
welfare enhancing and that it should therefore be
an objective of the European Union. This is
consistent with the view taken by the European
Commission. The Commission’s Digital Single
Market strategy, adopted on 6 May 2015,
promises that in 2016 an ambitious overhaul of
the telecoms regulatory framework will be
proposed, and will focus, among other aims, on
investment in high-speed broadband infrastruc-
ture (European Commission, 2015).
EU markets for electronic communications net-
works and services are regulated according to the
2002 eCommunications framework. Among its
main provisions is the mandated sharing of
telecommunications infrastructure, which allows
entrants to compete with incumbents. The
eCommunications framework was created for
copper-based legacy networks, but has been
extended to cover NGA networks, which provide
users with radically improved broadband access
to data, based on fibre-optic cable technologies.
Academic research shows that, among various
cost and demand side factors that have an impact
on the deployment of NGA networks, regulatory
access policies play a crucial role. In this Policy
Contribution, we discuss how these regulations –
devised at EU level and implemented at national
level – might affect the deployment of NGA networks.
We start with an analysis of recent NGA trends in
EU member states, and assess if the European
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Commission’s policy goals are being met1. We then
review the experience with broadband deploy-
ment in the EU and other selected economies. We
discuss the differences and similarities in the
economics of the ‘old’ broadband (using legacy
networks based on copper and coaxial cables)
and the ‘new’ broadband (using NGA networks),
and assess the extent to which lessons learned
about regulation of legacy networks can be trans-
ferred to NGA networks. We then discuss the
current regulatory framework for NGA networks
and in Box 1 on page 9 highlight case studies of
EU member states that did particularly well in
terms of NGA deployment. This enables us to high-
light the key trade-offs involved in regulation of NGA
networks and to formulate a set of recommenda-
tions to policymakers.
Our key finding is that the underlying differences
between the economics of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’
broadband infrastructures should lead to a
revision of the current regulatory framework for
telecommunications markets. While the regula-
tory framework for copper-based networks was
useful in the past decade to sustain competition
in a market with already existing infrastructures,
the need to create new broadband networks calls
for a rethink.
2 NGA COVERAGE, PENETRATION AND TAKE-UP
RATES 
Figure 1 shows NGA coverage and NGA penetra-
tion for 25 EU member states. NGA coverage is
measured by the total number of lines that enable
fast broadband internet access that are available
to homes or businesses (‘homes passed’2) . Net-
work coverage thus refers to the number of con-
sumers that in principle have access to fast
broadband. NGA penetration refers to the actual
number of NGA subscribers. Figure 1 captures
almost the entire period of NGA deployment in EU
member states and shows that the coverage and
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Figure 1: Fast broadband coverage and penetration rates per household in 25 EU member states for
the years from 2005 to 2014
Source: FTTH Council Europe. Note: Data are available from FTTH Council Europe for the group of the EU25 member states
(Malta, Cyprus and Croatia are excluded).  The coverage for Luxembourg is 2.31 in 2014, which is not reported, because we
have restricted the presentation to an upper-bound of 2 for illustrative purposes.
Figure 2: Ultra-fast broadband coverage and penetration rates per household in 25 EU member
states for the years from 2005 to 2014 
Source: FTTH Council Europe. Note: Data are available from FTTH Council Europe for the group of the EU25 member states (Malta,
Cyprus and Croatia are excluded). 
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the penetration follow a more or less dynamic dif-
fusion process. Even though some EU member
states do particularly well in terms of NGA deploy-
ment, as Figures 1 and 2 show, Europe lags behind
a number of non-European nations, including
Japan, Korea and the United States (FTTH Council
Europe, 2015; Yoo, 2014; OECD, 2013).
In order to stimulate greater NGA coverage and
penetration, the European Commission’s Digital
Agenda strategy, of which the Digital Single Market
plan is a part, said that the EU should “ensure that,
by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much
higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii)
50 percent or more of European households
subscribe to internet connections above 100
Mbps” (European Commission, 2010). In Figures 1
and 2, the horizontal lines at penetration and cov-
erage values equal to 0.5 and 1 mark the Digital
Agenda goals. The mean value of fast broadband
coverage already equalled approximately 100
percent in 2014, which on average fulfils goal (i) of
the Digital Agenda for the 25 member states in our
analysis. Ultra-fast broadband coverage, however,
is much lower with an average mean value of only
about 35 percent (Figure 2)3.
There also appears to be a substantial gap in pen-
etration rates. The average NGA penetration rates
for fast broadband and ultra-fast broadband are
only 25 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Overall, when comparing fast broadband deploy-
ment in terms of coverage and penetration with
ultra-fast broadband, one finds similar growth
patterns but notably lower levels for the latter in
most EU states. In some countries (such as Aus-
tria, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom),
ultra-fast broadband deployment has started on
very small scale or not at all. Instead, operators
focus on much less cost-intense upgrades to the
traditional copper and coaxial cable technologies.
Hence, the Digital Agenda's goal (ii) for connection
speeds above 100 Mbps is still far from being
realised.
In fact, numbers on NGA coverage and penetration
overestimate the actual coverage and penetration
because of double counting in many member
states. In particular, in urban areas, there is double
counting of homes passed by cable television
operators and traditional telecommunications
operators. In addition, business establishments,
which promise high returns, might be passed by
parallel NGA infrastructures. This is why the
coverage levels in Figures 1 and 2 sometimes
exceed 100 percent. This is the case for Germany,
for example, but in fact only 74.6 percent of all
German households actually had access to ≥ 30
Mbit/s fixed-line broadband technologies at the
end of 2014 (TÜVRheinland, 2014).
3 LEGACY-BASED INFRASTRUCTURE
REGULATION
The EU regulatory framework for electronic
communications markets has established a broad
system of cost-based access pricing since voice
telephony markets started to be liberalised in
1997-98 (European Commission, 1998; European
Commission, 2002). This allowed market entrants
to offer narrowband voice telephony products,
which substantially reduced average call prices in
the first phase of sector-specific regulation. The
EU regulatory framework then implemented man-
dated wholesale access to the local loop (Euro-
pean Commission, 2000), thus enabling market
entrants to offer consumers narrowband voice and
broadband either as bundled or stand-alone serv-
ices. Incumbent operators were required to
‘unbundle’ the legacy access infrastructure, ie to
rent parts of it to new entrants based on cost-
based access charges, and to allow entrants to
collocate their infrastructure at a switching office
close to the users.
Four access options have provided entrants with a
variety of viable business cases, thereby allowing
them to effectively compete with the incumbent
in offering broadband services:
Full unbundling, which implies that entrants•
rent the entire local loop to offer a voice-
broadband bundle to consumers;
Shared access (ie line sharing), which means•
that entrants rent the upper line’s bandwidth
in order to offer broadband only;
Bitstream access, ie mandated wholesale•
access to the incumbent’s networks at a more
elementary level of the value chain;
the access point for bitstream is beyond the
3. We define ‘ultra-fast
broadband’ as based on the
fastest of the FTTx architec-
tures, ie FTTP; see the
technical annex for more
details. The division of
various technologies into
the fast (over 30 Mbps)
and ultra-fast (over 100
Mbps) categories, is
somewhat blurred. Our
approach is to count as
ultrafast only those
technologies that can
guarantee 100 Mbps for
every subscriber
at all times.
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4. Only mandated access to
passive infrastructure
components such as ducts
that the entrants may use
to reach access points is
supposed to be necessary
at this final stage of
liberalisation.
5. For critical assessments
of the ladder of investment
hypothesis, see Bouckaert
et al (2010) and Bourreau
et al (2010). Econometric
evidence is provided by
Grajek and Röller (2012),
who show that stricter
access regulation
depressed total investment
in telecoms in EU member
states. Bachace et al
(2014) find partial support
for the ladder-of-investment
theory, showing that in the
EU, entrants mostly climb
the ‘shorter’ ladder from bit-
stream to unbundling but
do not reach the ‘higher’
rung from unbundling to
fibre. Nardotto et al (2015)
show that unbundling in the
UK resulted in no increase
in broadband penetration
but had a strongly positive
impact on the quality
of service.
local loops and usually closer to the entrants’
core network, but entrants also have less
ability to differentiate the broadband services
based on bitstream compared to full
unbundling or line sharing;
Simple resale, which requires the least•
network investment; resale means that the
access-seeking operators receive and resell
a wholesale input from the incumbent
without any scope for technological product
differentiation (Briglauer et al, 2015).
Figure 3 shows the hierarchy of access options,
as viewed by the European Commission. This view
was based on the ladder-of-investment hypothe-
sis, according to which the different access
options lead to a gradual increase in infrastructure
investment by new entrants over the liberalisation
period (Cave, 2006; Cave and Vogelsang, 2003).
Thus, by facilitating entry, access regulation was
intended to promote broadband take-up by
keeping consumer prices in check and simulta-
neously creating incentives for new infrastructure
investment. Ultimately, entrants were expected to
deploy their own access infrastructure and
engage in fully-fledged facilities-based
competition with incumbents4.
More than a decade of broadband access
regulation in Europe has shown, however, that the
ladder-of-investment hypothesis works mainly for
the lower rungs of the investment ladder. This calls
for comparatively low investment requirements,
especially, for moves from resale to bitstream
access. Empirical evidence suggests that
mandatory local loop unbundling has not led
entrants to ramp up access network infrastructure
as expected. In fact, unbundling might have even
reduced total industry investment, meaning that
investment by entrants has not been sufficient to
offset the unrealised investments of incumbents5.
The fact that the ex-ante access obligations did not
result in the service-based entrants deploying
enough access infrastructure can be interpreted
as the “natural outcome of the economics of fixed
broadband access” (Vogelsang, 2013).
In essence, by depressing the prices of retail
broadband services, mandatory wholesale access
policies render investment in competing
technologies, such as cable broadband, less
attractive. Similarly, telecoms entrants often
prefer to rent unbundled elements at mandated
access rates rather than build their own parallel
infrastructure. As access conditions become more
favourable, entrants’ opportunity costs for self-
deployed access infrastructure increase and “wait
and see strategies” (Guthrie, 2006) become more
attractive. In our view (see section 5) this is not
necessarily bad for economic welfare, especially
if the unrealised investment would merely
duplicate existing access network infrastructure.
But it should be acknowledged as an outcome of
mandated wholesale access. This lost investment
is also likely to be a by-product of regulation of
NGAs, as we discuss in the next section.
In contrast to the EU, in 2005 the US regulator
largely removed the unbundling regime, which
was rather comprehensive at that time. The deci-
sion to deregulate broadband markets was based
on the almost nationwide duopoly market
structure, which was considered to ensure enough
competitive pressure. In fact, facilities-based com-
Figure 3: Hierarchy of wholesale access remedies
Source: European Commission (2010).
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6. By facilities-based
competition we mean
competition between
operators that own
infrastructure, which allows
each of them to deliver
broadband services without
needing to rent infrastructure
from competitors.
In contrast,  service-based
competition relies on
mandated infrastructure
sharing.
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tion in the case of NGA networks. Investment in
NGA networks, in particular ultra-fast broadband,
is more likely to suffer from the hold-up problem
because investment in the ‘old’ broadband access
upgrade was more incremental, while it is very
substantial for ‘new’ broadband. Thus, the situa-
tion is very different on the supply side of the
equation: the software and equipment needed to
upgrade the legacy network to support
petition emerged in the US telecommunications
market almost entirely because of the cable oper-
ators with prior access infrastructure (Vogelsang,
2015)6. With the ladder-of-investment hypothe-
sis, the European Commission took the opposite
approach, although it has never been coherently
applied (Vogelsang, 2015).
Although the EU broadband access regulations
have been only partly successful in facilitating
infrastructure investment and facilities-based
competition, the eCommunications framework
should not be judged as ineffective, especially in
international comparison. Table 1 shows that all
OECD countries experienced a similar pattern of
growth of first-generation fixed-line broadband
subscriptions from 2009-13. A country’s position
in the ranking highly correlates with its economic
development level: the richest countries generally
have higher subscription rates per 100 inhabi-
tants. The level of economic development alone
does not tell the full story, however. Japan and the
US are only slightly above the OECD average. In
contrast, the major western European economies,
including France, Germany, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom, which are comparable to US
in levels of economic development, do much
better in terms of ‘old’ broadband penetration. The
Scandinavian countries, which have a long
tradition of public subsidies for broadband and a
high level of consumer ICT-affinity (Briglauer and
Gugler, 2013), also beat the US and Japan in the
ranking. Overall, the EU access regulations seem
to have worked relatively well in facilitating broad-
band take-up by consumers.
The favourable outcome in terms of European
broadband penetration does not mean that the
fundamental trade-off inherent in wholesale
access policies does not work. Reducing market
prices through mandated access fosters the take-
up of broadband services, but hinders investment
in infrastructure. Note that the broadband pene-
tration figures (Table 1) capture the result of both
the demand and the supply factors and thus
simply illustrate how this trade-off played out in
the past. The underlying differences between the
economics of ‘old’ and ‘new’ broadband infra-
structures, however, are likely to tilt the trade-off in
an unfavourable direction by aggravating the
negative impact on investment of access regula-
Table 1: Total fixed-line basic broadband
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
OECD country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Switzerland 35.6 38.191 40.252 42.586 45.239
Netherlands 37.094 38.099 38.928 39.722 40.441
Denmark 36.167 37.228 37.616 38.833 40.209
France 30.655 32.778 34.683 36.396 37.649
Korea 33.239 34.797 35.876 36.501 37.471
Norway 33.87 34.528 35.216 36.219 36.946
Iceland 32.818 33.651 34.484 34.811 35.775
United Kingdom 29.675 31.471 33.011 34.258 35.559
Germany 30.456 31.911 33.243 34.063 34.838
Belgium 28.866 30.843 32.145 33.284 34.393
Canada 29.591 30.703 31.701 32.417 33.473
Sweden 31.627 31.924 31.97 32.218 32.738
Luxembourg 29.185 30.718 31.501 32.107 32.52
Finland 28.729 28.577 30.082 30.966 31.536
New Zealand 22.83 24.851 26.611 28.77 30.197
United States 25.501 26.716 27.7 28.726 29.695
Japan 24.714 26.565 27.273 27.671 28.044
OECD – Total 22.963 24.389 25.356 26.111 26.958
Spain 21.308 23.359 24.477 24.646 26.309
Greece 17.118 20.177 22.14 24.208 26.234
Austria 21.105 22.899 24.222 25.002 26.149
Australia 22.997 23.998 24.155 24.831 25.994
Estonia 22.463 23.279 24.764 24.537 25.488
Israel 23.473 23.856 24.204 24.704 25.124
Slovenia 21.537 22.812 23.755 24.405 25.115
Ireland 19.179 20.646 21.709 22.649 24.434
Portugal 17.757 19.78 21.113 22.594 24.124
Hungary 17.812 19.562 20.922 21.88 23.067
Italy 20.024 21.585 22.11 22.133 22.273
Czech Republic 12.915 14.555 15.776 16.633 17.383
Poland 12.832 13.816 14.899 15.706 15.638
Slovakia 11.586 12.788 13.833 14.768 15.629
Chile 9.711 10.405 11.584 12.378 13.002
Mexico 8.394 9.813 10.335 10.618 11.276
Turkey 8.854 9.73 10.251 10.492 11.192
Source: OECD (oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband). Note: based on total
population; subscriptions with ≥ 256 kbit/s download speed.
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7. The exceptions are
Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, Ireland,
Malta, the Netherlands and
Romania.
8. Information on the
mandated NGA regimes in
the EU comes from WIK
(2012) and notifications
submitted by EU member
states under Articles 7 and
7a of the Electronic
Communications
Framework Directive
(2002/21/EC), available at
https://circabc.europa.eu/fa
ces/jsp/extension/wai/navi
gation/container.jsp. 
first-generation broadband services were much
cheaper to install than new physical access infra-
structure such as fibre-optic cables. On the
demand side, there is still a significant uncertainty
about the willingness of consumers to pay for
higher-speed broadband access. Because the
regulatory approach to legacy networks has been
by and large extended to the NGA networks, we
expect underinvestment in the NGA infrastructure
in the EU, especially in ultra-fast broadband.
4 NGA INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATION
The directives of the eCommunications framework
have been supplemented by European
Commission recommendations on “regulated
access to next generation access networks”
(European Commission, 2010) and “consistent
non-discrimination obligations and costing
methodologies to promote competition and
enhance the broadband investment environment”
(European Commission, 2013) to form the
relevant EU regulatory framework for the emerg-
ing NGA infrastructure. This framework imposes
rather comprehensive and strict access
obligations compared to the US (Briglauer and
Gugler, 2013). The Commission’s approach to the
regulation of NGAs can be seen as a direct
extension of the eCommunications framework
created for the ‘first-generation’ legacy networks.
The regulatory remedies dealing with access to
NGA infrastructure fall into two broad categories,
passive and active. The passive remedies grant
access to civil engineering infrastructure – in
particular ducts – which significantly lowers the
costs of laying cables for entrants. To varying
degrees, most EU national regulators implement
the passive remedies7. Active remedies require
the dominant operators to provide access to their
physical network infrastructure. This includes
wholesale ‘bitstream’ access to NGA infrastruc-
ture, which is much less investment intensive for
potential access seekers than laying their own
cables. In contrast to passive remedies, member
states implement the active remedies very
differently in terms of timing and scope (Briglauer
et al, 2015). Some EU countries started to intro-
duce regulations on wholesale access (such as
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands or Spain)
and fibre unbundling (Finland and the Nether-
lands) already in 2011 (WIK, 2012). Some, such
as Belgium and Germany, have still not decided,
at time of writing, on access conditions or prices.
The scope of access regulations varies widely
depending on the network architecture and the
competition conditions in national markets.
The national regulatory authorities take also
different positions on how to price NGA-specific
capital costs. Some (such as Denmark, Hungary
and Ireland) have followed the Commission’s
recommendation and have applied incremental
cost-oriented access prices. Others, such as
Bulgaria, Estonia and Spain, so far have not8.
As we have discussed, access regulations can
significantly hold-up investment. We expect this
problem to be less acute in the case of passive
remedies, especially in areas where the ducts
have already been built. Active remedies, however,
especially when coupled with incremental
cost-based access pricing, can substantially
impede fibre deployment, because of the hold-up
problem. 
As well as affecting total investment volumes,
active remedies involved in NGA regulation can
also be expected to have an impact on which
companies invest and which do not. The asym-
metric nature of fibre unbundling as required by
the eCommunications framework, to a great extent
deters investment by incumbents, most of which
still hold significant market power,
according to the European Commission’s method-
ology. In fact, it appears that the incumbent
operators’ legacy-like market dominance is fading.
For instance, as of December 2014, investment by
incumbents was responsible for only 27.7 percent
of EU homes passed by ultra-fast connections.
Among entrants, municipalities and utilities were
responsible for 4.9 percent, and alternative oper-
ators, mostly cable companies, were responsible
for the largest part, 67.4 percent (FTTH Council
Europe, 2015; the remaining share was accounted
for by other firms such as housing companies).
NGA infrastructure owned by entrants is not
subject to regulated access.
Similar to the legacy-based infrastructure
regulation, the Commission foresees multilevel
access to the NGA infrastructure that belongs to
operators holding significant market power, with
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9. According to WIK (2008),
a competitive duplication of
fixed access network
infrastructure is at most
economically feasible in
very densely populated
areas. But still, even in such
a case, the second operator
needs to have a high market
share.
varying degrees of investment for access seekers.
The ladder-of-investment approach is again
considered as a guiding principle for regulating
NGA infrastructure (European Commission, 2010,
recital 3: “The appropriate array of remedies
imposed by a national regulatory authority should
reflect a  proportionate application of the ladder
of investment principle”). Considering the deploy-
ment costs, the duplication of NGA infrastructure
is,  however, unlikely to be more common than the
duplication of legacy networks. Thus, reaching the
ultimate goal of infrastructure-based competition
on NGA networks (last rung of the ladder-of-invest-
ment) is unlikely9. Compared to legacy networks,
the unbundled fibre access products are much
closer to previous bitstream access products, ie
at a lower point of the value chain (OECD, 2011).
Taking the ladder-of-investment perspective,
national regulatory authorities should aim to
induce optimal movements up both the legacy
and the NGA ladders, and optimal incentives for
migration between the ladders (Cave, 2010). Even
if the NGA infrastructure is not regulated, the
copper access charges imposed on the old
infrastructure will still exert a crucial impact on the
incentives for NGA investment (Bourreau et al,
2012). If a broad NGA roll-out is considered to be
welfare enhancing, incumbents and entrants
should ideally switch from investing in the ‘old’
infrastructure and requesting legacy-based
access products, to investing up the ‘new’ NGA
ladder. However, operators are not only confronted
with the regulatory access policies imposed under
the old and new ladders, but also experience
uncertainty about the demand for new services
that will be possible once the NGA networks are in
place. Thus, the NGA investment decision is far
more complex than it was for first-generation
broadband on the legacy networks.
The theoretical research on migration from legacy
to fibre-based infrastructure, points out that the
regulation of legacy networks affects in many
ways the incentives to invest in fibre infrastruc-
tures (Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan, 2012;
Inderst and Peitz, 2012; and Bourreau et al, 2014).
Moreover,  the expected effects significantly differ
for incumbents and new entrants. Incumbents
might invest more in new infrastructure when the
access price to the old network is low, and thus the
opportunity cost of the investment is low. This
effect might however be dampened or even
reversed, if the low prices discourage customers
from switching away from the legacy network. By
contrast, entrants will most likely speed up the
deployment of new infrastructure when access
charges for copper are high. In general, NGA
investments ‘cannibalise’ economic profits from
first-generation broadband services provided via
legacy infrastructure, which might thus reduce
profitability and the incentive to invest in NGA
infrastructure. This effect is reinforced if conven-
tional broadband services enjoy broad consumer
acceptance, which establishes non-negligible
switching costs for consumers and hinders
migration to the new technology, unless its
incremental benefits are sufficiently large and
transparent. In sum, there is no clear effect of
regulated access to legacy networks on NGA
investment.
A social-welfare perspective further suggests that
strict regulation to ensure access to legacy
networks safeguards consumers against paying
higher prices for faster broadband services they
might not really need. In areas where NGA net-
works will replace legacy networks, the legacy-like
quality of service (and the related access regula-
tion) could be sustained in order to prevent those
operators that lack their own infrastructure from
becoming stranded. These operators would then
provide the ‘old’ broadband services, but over
fibre. Needless to say, as legacy networks will con-
tinue to exist in parallel with NGA networks, con-
sumers will still be able to use the ‘old’ broadband
if they do not need higher speeds.
Interestingly, 10 out of the top 20 ranked
European economies in terms of ultra-fast broad-
band penetration are eastern European countries
(including Russia and Ukraine; FTTH Council
Europe 2015). There, the lack of well-established
legacy infrastructure meant there was an oppor-
tunity to directly deploy high-end network archi-
tectures at comparatively low cost (Briglauer and
Gugler, 2013; Briglauer, 2014).
In line with the above analysis, the empirical
research “indicates a negative impact of ex-ante
access regulations on NGA investment incentives”
(Briglauer et al, 2015). This corroborates the
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10. Information on the
national broadband plans of
EU member states is
available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/high-speed-
broadband. See also the
European Commission's
press release of
20 January 2011:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-54_en.htm.
BOX 1: SOME CASE STUDIES
Interesting insights about the link between regulation and NGA investment can be obtained from an
examination of the frontrunners in NGA deployment: those EU member states that reached 100 percent
coverage in terms of fast broadband and 50 percent coverage in terms of ultra-fast broadband by 2014
(Figures 1 and 2). These are Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain
and Sweden.
A number of these countries have a GDP per capita below the EU average. Nevertheless, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania in particular have proved very successful in deploying NGA networks. What the three Baltic
States have in common is relatively low first-generation broadband penetration – Estonia, the leader in
the region, is still below the OECD average (Table 1) – and the lack of strict cost-oriented fibre access obli-
gations. The former factor is shared with other eastern European EU members. The latter is not. Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia all introduced stricter fibre access regulations than the Baltic States and
have achieved less spectacular investments in fibre. The exception is the Czech Republic, where NGA
network expansion has been rather weak despite the lack of strict regulation. The examples of Bulgaria
and Romania seem to corroborate this picture. Both lacked a well-developed legacy infrastructure, have
abstained from strict NGA regulation and have been very successful in deploying fibre, albeit only the
ultra-fast architecture in Bulgaria.
Additionally, EU funds have helped to subsidise the broadband infrastructure in the eastern member
states. Partly in response to the European Commission's Digital Agenda strategy, most EU member states
developed national broadband plans which usually included public funding measures. For the 2007-13
financing period, €2.3 billion in EU structural funds was allocated to meet the Digital Agenda targets for
broadband roll-out. The Commission also approved under EU state aid rules about €3.4 billion of member
state spending from 2003 to 2010 for  high-speed broadband development projects10 .
Among the other NGA frontrunners, the mix of weak legacy infrastructure and lax access regulation, which
has proven very effective in incentivising operators to invest, also pertains in Portugal and Spain. In con-
trast, Greece and Ireland, which introduced incremental-cost oriented fibre unbundling, have not
successfully deployed NGA infrastructure, despite weak legacy broadband penetration.
Countries with well-developed first-generation broadband infrastructure have generally found it difficult
to successfully deploy NGA networks. The exceptions are Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden. Each has
introduced strict NGA obligations, which might suggest that in this group, access regulation actually spurs
investment. A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced picture. In two cases, large-scale broadband
deployment has been triggered by more or less direct public subsidies. Large public investments in
ultra-fast broadband played a significant role in Sweden (Yoo, 2014). In Luxembourg, P&T Luxembourg,
the state-owned incumbent, is working towards the government’s ambitious target of providing all citizens
with a minimum of 1 Gbps downstream access by 2020 (FTTH Council Europe, 2013a).
Denmark is an interesting example because of the unusual ownership structure of the broadband
providers. The incumbent telecom operator, TDC, owns most of the cable companies. This allows TDC to
deploy high-speed cable broadband, access to cable being unregulated. The mandated access to fibre on
the telecom networks remains unused. Instead, the entrants, mostly energy companies, invest in ultra-
fast fibre infrastructure themselves (Yoo, 2014). As operators without significant market power, the
entrants are not subject to the mandated unbundling. As a result, competition between cable and telecom
high-speed broadband operators happens entirely outside of the regulatory framework, making Denmark
similar to the US in this respect.
In sum, lax fibre access regulation seems to promote NGA deployment in countries that lack
well-developed broadband infrastructure based on legacy networks. In countries that have well-developed
first-generation broadband, the impact of regulation is less obvious. The business case for fibre in these
countries seems,  however, not obvious either. In fact, incentives for consumers to migrate from the legacy
to the fibre-based broadband crucially depend on the retail price differential, ‘the fibre premium’. Consumer
willingness to pay for high-speed broadband services seems to be rather limited so far (DotEcon, 2012).
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11. Korea is an example of
smart housing regulations
boosting investment in
fibre. See OECD (2013).
12. The detailed discussion
of how informal subsidies
boosted large-scale NGA
deployment in Japan can
be found in Ota (2009).
results of the literature that studies first-genera-
tion broadband, surveyed in Cambini and Jiang
(2009), which finds similar albeit less-pro-
nounced empirical evidence. There is, however, no
empirical research that specifically considers the
joint presence of copper-based-access and NGA
regulations and their joint impact on investment
incentives.
5   DISCUSSION OF THE KEY POLICY ISSUES FOR
NGA DEPLOYMENT
The experience with first-generation broadband
deployment in Europe shows that, in general,
lowering market prices through mandated access
fosters the take-up of broadband services, but
might hinder investment in infrastructure. Against
this backdrop, the unbundling of legacy networks
in Europe has worked rather well. In particular, the
penetration rates compare favourably to the
leading economies worldwide. Furthermore, the
unrealised infrastructure investment, which is the
downside of access regulation, might not
necessarily have been bad for economic welfare,
especially if the investment would have merely
led to duplication of the existing access network
infrastructure. The European experience shows,
however, that access policies suppress
fully-fledged facilities competition and, as a result,
tend to be permanent rather than transitory. This is
also likely to be true for NGA networks and should
be acknowledged as an important constraint of
mandated fibre access.
Will the qualified success of regulated access be
replicated in the future? Our analysis shows that
this is doubtful. For NGA networks, the underlying
differences between the economics of the ‘old’
and the ‘new’ broadband infrastructures are likely
to aggravate the negative impact of access
regulation on investment. Investment in NGA
networks is more likely to suffer from the hold-up
problem, because laying the fibre-optic elements
of the local loops needed for ultra-fast broadband
is much more expensive than the upgrades
needed for the ‘old’ broadband. As a result, under
the current regulatory regime we expect
continuing underinvestment in NGA infrastructure
and therefore underachievement of Digital Agenda
goals, especially for the more costly ultra-fast
broadband infrastructure.
Although we have focused on sector-specific
access regulations, NGA deployment is also
influenced by other public policies. Most notably,
public funding programmes, housing regulations11
and regulations on net neutrality will have a strong
influence on the development of market-based
business models and firm profitability and hence
on NGA investment. Public subsidies (direct or
indirect) for NGA infrastructure are an effective
way of stimulating investment, as the examples
of Japan and Luxembourg show most clearly12. EU
structural funds provided to the eastern European
countries might have also played an important
role. More generally, subsidies appear essential
in areas where private investment is not profitable
but NGA roll-out might still be desirable in view of
externalities or equity motives. Other forms of
subsidy, such as publicly-sponsored eHealth
programmes might also give a push to the
deployment of fast broadband infrastructure. Net
neutrality regulations might render infrastructure
investment more profitable if network operators
are given more leeway to provide high-quality
access to content providers at premium prices.
Our basic assumption is that wide NGA roll-out
will be welfare enhancing for Europe because of
the potential positive externalities, which are
likely to increase over years and decades. This
leads us to formulate three recommendations to
the regulators.
First, while a nationwide NGA roll-out might be
efficient and justified by equity concerns,
we recommend de-emphasising fully-fledged
facilities-based competition as the ultimate goal
of the eCommunications framework. Large-scale
facilities based competition has proved unrealis-
tic in most member states and, in fact, not
consistent with the economics of mandated fixed-
broadband access. Instead, regulators should
acknowledge that access regulation is likely to
persist for the foreseeable future and should
commit to a clear methodology for calculating
access prices. The focus of the regulation should
shift towards efficient investment, meaning
provision of a single infrastructure needed for
ultra-fast broadband, especially in areas where
the natural market structure is a monopoly. Note
that efficient investment might also include
mobile broadband to a greater extent in the mid
11
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONWHY IS EUROPE LAGGING ON NEXT GENERATION ACCESS NETWORKS?
and long term, particularly in areas where no wired
NGA infrastructure exists.
Second, the eCommunications framework should
provide additional incentives to invest in ultra-fast
broadband infrastructure. This could for instance
be achieved by relaxing cost-oriented pricing of
fibre access for a limited period. At this end of this
period, consumers would further benefit from
service-based competition enabled by a
cost-oriented access policy. Co-investment
models might also provide a relevant alternative
to prevent infrastructure duplication. We concur
with Vogelsang (2013), who argued that
incentivising efficient NGA investment requires a
shift in the regulatory frontier towards softer
regulation, including symmetric regulations that 
enhance co-investment models.
Third, we recommend taking a more holistic and
evidence-based approach to access regulation. As
we have shown, there is a range of alternative
public policies that might spur investment in
access networks. These policies should be given
serious consideration. Also, the regulation of
access to the legacy copper networks can be
expected to have significant effects on NGA
deployment. The migration from copper to fibre
thus involves an intertwined set of incentives on
the demand and the supply sides. It is not clear
whether sustaining incremental-cost-oriented
access to the legacy networks helps the NGA
roll-out. One important reason, however, to main-
tain the current regulation of the legacy networks,
is to safeguard consumers against paying higher
prices for ultra-fast broadband services they do
not really need. Overall, more evidence is needed
as a basis for sound policy advice in this domain.
REFERENCES
Bacache, M., M. Bourreau and G. Gaudin (2014) ‘Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastruc-
tures: Empirical evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry’, Review of Industrial Organization, 44:
179-209
Bouckaert, J., T. van Dijk, and F. Verboven (2010) ‘Access regulation, competition, and broadband
penetration: An international study’, Telecommunications Policy, 34: 661-671
Bourreau, M., P. Dogan and M. Manant (2010) ‘A Critical Review of the Ladder of Investment
Approach’, Telecommunications Policy, 34: 683-696
Bourreau, M., C. Cambini and P. Dogan (2012) ‘Access Pricing, Competition, and Incentives to Migrate
From “Old” to “New” Technology’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30: 713-723
Bourreau, M., C. Cambini and P. Dogan (2014) ‘Access Regulation and the Transition from Copper to
Fibre Networks in Telecoms’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 45(3): 233-258
Briglauer, W. (2014) ‘The Impact of Regulation and Competition on the Adoption of Fibre-Based
Broadband Services: Recent Evidence from the European Member States’, Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 46: 51-79
Briglauer, W. (2015) ‘How EU sector-specific regulations and competition affect migration from old
to new communications infrastructure: recent evidence from EU27 member states’, Journal of Regu-
latory Economics, 48(2): 194-217
Briglauer, W., S. Frübing and I. Vogelsang (2015) ‘The Impact of Alternative Public Policies on the
Deployment of New Communications Infrastructure – A Survey’, Review of Network Economics,
forthcoming
Briglauer, W. and K. Gugler (2013) ‘The Deployment and Adoption of High-Speed Fibre Networks and
Services: Why are European Member States Lagging Behind?’ Telecommunications Policy, 37: 819-
835
Cave, M. (2006) ‘Encouraging Infrastructure Investment via the Ladder of Investment’,
Telecommunications Policy, 30: 223-237
Cave, M. and I. Vogelsang (2003) ‘How Access Pricing and Entry Interact’, Telecommunications
Policy, 27: 717-727
Cave, M. (2010) ‘Snakes and ladders: Unbundling in a next generation world’, Telecommunications
12
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION WHY IS EUROPE LAGGING ON NEXT GENERATION ACCESS NETWORKS?
Policy, 34: 80-85
DotEcon (2012) Regulatory policy and the roll-out of fibre-to-the-home networks, report for the
FTTH Council Europe, available at: http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/Reports/2012/Dot-econ_Reg-
ulatory_Report.pdf 
European Commission (1998) ‘Notice on the application of competition rules to access agreements
in the telecommunications sector: Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles’, 98/C 265/02
European Commission (2000) Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop
European Commission (2002) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services (“Framework Directive”)
European Commission (2010) ‘Commission Recommendation of 20 September 2010 on regulated
access to Next Generation Access Networks (NGA)’, (2010) 572/EU
European Commission (2013) ‘Commission Recommendation of 11 September 2013 consistent
non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the
broadband investment environment’, C (2013) 5761 final
European Commission (2015) A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final
FTTH Council Europe (2013a) ‘P&T Luxembourg Invests in National FTH Coverage’, FTTH Case Study
FTTH Council Europe (2013b) FTTH Business Guide, Edition 4, available at:
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/Publications/FTTH_Business_Guide_2013_V4.0.pdf
FTTH Council Europe (2014) FTTH Handbook, Edition 6, available at:
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/EN/home/forms/form-handbook
FTTH Council Europe (2015) ‘Creating a connected continent’, presentation at FTTH Conference,
Warsaw, Poland, available at: http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/Presentations/20150211Press-
ConfWarsaw.pdf
Grajek M. and L-H Röller (2012) ‘Regulation and investment in network industries: Evidence from
European telecoms’, Journal of Law and Economics 55(1): 189–216
Grzybowski L. and J. Liang (2015) ‘Estimating Demand for Fixed-Mobile Bundles and Switching
Costs between Tariffs’, mimeo
Guthrie, G. (2006) ‘Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment’, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 44(4): 925-972
Inderst, R. and M. Peitz (2012) ‘Market Asymmetries and Investments in NGA’, Review of Network
Economics, 11(1), article 2
Nardotto, M., T. Valletti and F. Verboven (2015) ‘Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broad-
band’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(2): 330-362
OECD (2011) Fibre access-network development in the OECD area, DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2010)10/Final
OECD (2013) ‘Broadband Networks and Open Access’, Digital Economy Papers No. 218
Ota, K. (2009) ‘The Telecom Policy for Broadband Diffusion: A case study in Japan’, in Preissl, B., J.
Haucap and P. Curven (eds) Telecommunication Markets: Drivers and Impediments, Physica-Verlag,
Heidelberg
Srinuan P., C. Srinuan and E. Bohlin (2012) ‘Fixed and Mobile Broadband Substitution in Sweden’,
Telecommunications Policy, 36: 237-251
TÜVRheinland (2014) Bericht zum Breitbandatlas Ende 2014, report commissioned by Bundesmin-
isterium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, Berlin
Vogelsang, I. (2013) ‘The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey’, Review of Economics,
64(3): 193-269
Vogelsang, I. (2015) ‘Will the US and EU Telecommunications Policies Converge? A Survey’, Econo-
mia e Politica Industriale, 42(2): 117-155
WIK (2008) The Economics of Next Generation Networks, report commissioned by ECTA, Bad
Honnef
13
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONWHY IS EUROPE LAGGING ON NEXT GENERATION ACCESS NETWORKS?
13. xDSL is a generic term
used for the Digital
Subscriber Line
technologies, which provide
internet access by
transmitting digital data
over telephone lines.
Asymmetric Digital
Subscriber Line (ADSL)
represents the most
commonly installed first-
generation xDSL
technology, which can offer
bandwidth up to 20 Mbps. A
more modern example is
VDSL, which stands for
Very-high-bit-rate Digital
Subscriber Line
14. DOCSIS stands for Data
Over Cable Service Interface
Specification.
15. Using a detailed dataset
of subscribers to a single
mobile operator from a
single town in a European
country which has full
coverage with LTE and fixed
(ADSL and FTTH) broadband
technologies, Grzybowski
and Liang (2015) find
evidence that mobile
broadband is
complementary to fixed
broadband access for
quadruple play subscribers.
Similar results have been
found in Srinuan et al
(2012) using a survey
database of 4,000
individuals collected by the
Swedish government.
TECHNICAL ANNEX: BROADBAND ARCHITECTURES
Historically, fixed-line legacy networks based on copper-wire infrastructure were built to support narrow-
band voice telephony services only. Later, these legacy networks were upgraded with so-called xDSL
technologies to deliver first-generation broadband services13. However, the performance of xDSL tech-
nologies based on copper infrastructure, and of coaxial cable data transmission technologies (ie for cable
television, CATV), is strongly limited by the remaining local access loop’s length. Hence, for xDSL to yield
higher bandwidth levels, fibre-optic cables have to be deployed  closer to the customer premises in the
access networks.
Depending on the fibre reach, different NGA architectures are distinguished. One refers to FTTC (fibre to the
cabinet or curb, sometimes also referred to as fibre to the node, FTTN) when the modern very-high-bit-
rate digital subscriber line (VDSL) technologies, such as VDSL2 and VDSL2 vectoring, are run on a hybrid
network (ie fibre-based network, which extends to street cabinets, and copper lines, which typically extend
about 500 metres from street cabinet to the customers’ premises). Fibre to the distribution point (FTTDp)
supported by VDSL/G.fast stands for another recent hybrid copper-fibre transmission technology.
FTTDp is very similar to FTTC/N but is one-step closer to the customer with the copper ‘last mile’ of nor-
mally less than 200 metres. VDSL-based hybrid solutions can provide bandwidths of between 20 Mbps
and several hundred Mbps. Fibre to the building (FTTB) requires the fibre-optic cables close to or inside a
building, eg in the basement of a multi-dwelling unit. In this architecture, the only copper-based connec-
tions remain between the customers’ premises and the building’s switch. FTTB yields bandwidths between
100 Mbps and up to 1Gbps. When technical or economic considerations render it feasible to completely
eliminate copper lines, then each subscriber can be connected by a dedicated fibre access line, an archi-
tecture referred to as fibre to the home (FTTH). FTTH infrastructure is said to be ‘future proof’, because data
transmission speed is limited by the terminal equipment rather than the fibre infrastructure. The result-
ing bandwidth capacity is almost unlimited in view of current applications. Finally, FTTP (fibre to the  prem-
ises) is used as a blanket term for the high-end FTTB/H architectures (Briglauer, 2014; FTTH Council Europe,
2014 ; Wikipedia, ‘Fibre to the x’).
Besides the FTTC/N/Dp/B/H architectures, NGA networks might also be realised by upgrading CATV
networks. This architecture is called fibre-to-the-last-amplifier (FTTLA) and means high-speed access
enabled by the DOCSIS 3.0 technology on hybrid fibre-coaxial cables14. In principle, this cable
transmission architecture is able to provide bandwidths between 100 and 200 Mbps. As customers
share cable coax infrastructure, however, they might be confronted with a substantial reduction in
bandwidth at peak times. In addition, CATV networks are optimised asymmetrically for downstream
usage and thus upstream capacity is more limited than in the fibre and hybrid technologies (FTTH
Council Europe, 2013b). The newer version of DOCSIS, the 3.1 version, can theoretically provide speeds
up to 10 Gbps.
Mobile broadband services are also feasible. In particular, the long-term evolution (LTE) technologies offer
data transmission rates in ranges comparable to fixed-line hybrid-fibre NGA architectures. Mobile
broadband represents a shared resource, however, because the access quality parameters depend
heavily on the number of concurrent users at a given location. Available bandwidth for the individual mobile
broadband user also crucially depends on the distance to the cell tower. For these reasons, we consider
LTE to be a viable outside alternative to fixed wire NGA broadband but not a close substitute for most
consumer segments, at least not in the medium term. Because of the different geographical coverage and
forms of usage some studies have even found LTE to be complementary to NGA broadband15.
